Sudan and South Sudan today are at war, and so is Sudan with its own peripheries in Darfur, East, Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan States while insecurity never stopped in some areas of South Sudan since 2005. To call it otherwise is political blindness or else convenience. What is happening today in Sudan is no mystery, but the direct result of the selective implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) by the Parties and accepted by the International community (the signatories and observers of the Naivasha peace process) in the past six years of interim period for the sake of ‘peace’ and ‘stability’ in the region.
The parenthesis of relative peace that the CPA brought for the six years of interim period – in its narrow sense of cessation of direct hostilities between the North and the South – allowed for the self-determination option for Southern Sudanese to be exerted, and resulted in the independence of South Sudan. That was only one of the objectives of the SPLM/A struggle enshrined in the CPA; the other one, the New Sudan, for a ‘united, democratic, secular’ country, just and equal for all, was abandoned in the first years of implementation (and some would say already in Machakos in 2002 when negotiations begun). The CPA, a liberal peace agreement, provided for peace to realise as a result of democracy and development in Sudan; however given the lack of transformation of both the NCP and the SPLM into sound national political parties, and the consequent lack of democratisation of Sudan as a whole (North and South) the CPA implementation was controlled by the Presidency, through a plethora of commissions and committees, at the exclusion of the other political forces in Sudan and in most cases of the international community. The CPA drafters did not foresee any provision about breaches of the Agreement. The CPA implementation became a technical matter, while the implementation of crucial political points was delayed and at times renegotiated such as the legislative transformation of Sudan, the process of National healing and Reconciliation, the protocol of Abyei and the conflict of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States.
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